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This paper shows that stricter enforcement may increase tax eva-
sion. Individuals vote on a linear income tax which is used to ﬁnance
lump sum transfers. Stricter enforcement may make redistributive
taxation more attractive to the decisive voter. The tax rate and trans-
fer may rise which in turn may increase tax evasion. An example shows
that this result can actually occur. The paper also discusses the in-
teraction between voting on taxes and the choice of audit rate by a
budget maximizing bureaucrat.
JEL classiﬁcation: H26, D72.
Keywords: Tax evasion, enforcement, voting.
11 Introduction
Following Allingham and Sandmo (1972) the literature has analyzed tax eva-
sion as a gamble by taxpayers, where the odds depend on enforcement by the
tax authority. From this model, the proposition that stricter enforcement –
through increased auditing frequency or larger ﬁnes – decreases tax evasion
follows straightforwardly. For instance, higher detection probabilities reduce
the marginal beneﬁt of evasion and therefore make evasion less attractive.1 In
extensions to this model, stricter enforcement may increase evasion through
taxpayers’ labor supply responses. For instance, with a backward bending
labor supply curve, it may be that with stricter enforcement individuals will
evade more (Cowell, 1985).
In this paper, I argue that stricter enforcement may increase tax evasion.
I present a model where voters decide on a linear income tax. Total proceeds
are used to ﬁnance lump sum grants. Taxpayers may choose to evade taxes,
and, hence, pay tax on their declared income. When enforcement becomes
stricter, taxpayers would evade less, for given tax rates. If richer individuals
evade particularly large amounts, stricter enforcement puts a larger burden
on them. Hence, lower income voters may prefer higher taxes since the tax
system becomes more progressive. In this case, while stricter enforcement in
itself reduces evasion, the eﬀects of the increased tax rate (and transfer) may
oﬀset this eﬀect, since higher taxes and transfers may make evasion more
attractive.
The model combines a standard tax evasion model with a majority voting
model of redistributive income taxes. The tax evasion model was pioneered
by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1973). The latter type
of model was explored by Romer (1975), Roberts (1977) and Meltzer and
Richard (1981). A model similar to the present one is presented by Roine
(1999), but he looks at (legal) tax avoidance instead of evasion. Hence,
enforcement plays no role in his model. His focus is also on the redistributive
1The earlier literature assumed that enforcement is exogenous. There are more recent
treatments which assume that enforcement is determined by the tax authority maximizing
against taxpayers. See Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998) for a survey of this and other
issues in tax compliance.
2properties of the voting model.2 The interplay between public goods supply
and tax evasion is studied by Cowell and Gordon (1988) and Falkinger (1991).
Two experimental studies on tax evasion and voting are presented by Alm,
Sanchez, and de Juan (1995) and Feld and Tyran (2002). Their focus is on
the inﬂuence of voting on social norms of tax compliance.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the model. The
voting game is introduced in section 3. Section 4 contains the comparative
statics. Section 5 presents a numerical example. The choice of audit rate is
endogenized in section 7, where bureaucrats are assumed to set audit rates
to maximize their budget. The last section concludes the paper.
2 The Model
Individuals have utility u(c), deﬁned over total consumption, c,w i t hu  >
0,u    ≤ 0. The absolute degree of risk aversion is ρ(c): =−u  (c)/u (c). I will
assume for most of this paper that ρ (c) ≤ 0, i.e. absolute risk aversion is non-
increasing in income. An individual is identiﬁed by her gross income level,
y, which is assumed to be exogenous. Income is distributed on the interval
[0,1], according to a cumulative distribution function Φ(y)w i t hd e n s i t yφ(y).
Total population is normalized to one, so aggregate and average income is
¯ y =
  1
0 yφ(y)dy. The distribution is assumed to be skewed to the right, so
median income, ym,i sl e s st h a n¯ y.
Income is subject to tax at a constant rate t. Tax revenue is used to
ﬁnance a lump-sum transfer g to every individual. Individuals are assumed
to pay taxes on their declared income. Thus, taxes are paid voluntarily only
if the expected ﬁne for evasion is high enough. Letting e denote the amount
of evasion, declared income is y − e.
I assume the following structure. At the ﬁrst stage, individuals vote on
the tax rate, and at the second, they decide how much of their income to
declare for given tax rate and transfer. Enforcement policy, namely, the prob-
ability of detection and the penalty schedule, are under the control of the tax
authority. The tax rate, however, is chosen democratically. The assumption
2See Borck (2002) for an analysis of the redistributive properties in a variant of the
present model.
3that enforcement parameters are eﬀectively chosen by government agencies
which are not perfectly controlled by voters seems a reasonable approxima-
tion to reality. In a diﬀerent context, Gordon and Wilson (1999) analyze the
choice of tax rate by voters, arguing that expenditures are under the control
of a bureaucracy. In section 7, this type of model will be used to explore
the interaction between voters and bureaucrats, but for now the audit rate
is assumed to be exogenous.
Suppose that individuals are audited with exogenous probability p,i n
which case they have to pay tax on the amount evaded plus a penalty which
is related to the amount of evasion. In particular, the penalty function is of
the form S = ((1 − a)+at)se,w h e r es is the penalty rate. For a =0 ,t h i s
conforms with the form assumed in Allingham and Sandmo (1972), while
a = 1 corresponds to the form assumed by Yitzhaki (1973) and subsequent
papers.3
Let b = ((1 − a)+at). Consumption in the state where the individual
is audited is then cd =( 1− t)y − bse + g. If the individual is not audited,
consumption is cn =( 1− t)y + te + g. The expected return to evasion will
be denoted r := (1 − p)t − pbs.F o ra<1, there is a tax rate, ˆ t =
(1−a)ps
1−(1+as)p
where r = 0. I will assume throughout that 0 < ˆ t<1.
For given tax rate, an individual’s maximization problem is
EU =m a x
e pu((1 − t)y − bse + g)+( 1− p)u((1 − t)y + te + g).





d =0 , (1)
where u 
i := u (ci).
Letting ˆ e be the solution to (1), the optimal amount of evasion is e∗ =
min{y,max{0, ˆ e}}. Note that for r>0, every individual will evade some
taxes.4
3The reason for this form is that in the example, it turns out that for a = 1 the median
voter’s preferred tax rate is 1, making comparative statics uninteresting.
4In reality, some individuals do not evade even for positive expected return, and fur-
thermore, some individuals overreport their taxes even though this is clearly irrational in
the standard model.
4The optimal amount of evasion (assuming an interior solution) is decreas-
ing in p and s: stricter enforcement reduces the marginal beneﬁt of evasion
and thus leads to less evasion for each taxpayer, given an exogenous tax rate.
For r (c) ≤ 0, evasion is non-decreasing in income. The eﬀect of an increase
in the tax rate is ambiguous for a<1: there is a substitution eﬀect – i.e.,
the higher tax rate increases the marginal return to evasion and therefore
makes evading more attractive – and an oﬀsetting income eﬀect – the lower
net income implied by a higher tax rate makes evasion less attractive, given
decreasing absolute risk aversion. However, when a = 1, the substitution
eﬀect is zero and evasion falls with a higher tax rate (Yitzhaki, 1973).
3 Voting
Each individual is assumed to vote for the tax rate which maximizes her
utility, subject to the government’s budget constraint (GBC):
g = t¯ y +( pbs − (1 − p)t)¯ e, (2)
where ¯ y and ¯ e are aggregate income and evasion.










¯ y +( pas − (1 − p))¯ e +( pbs − (1 − p)t)¯ et
((1 − p)t − pbs)¯ eg
.
Individuals’ preferences over tax policy diﬀer with respect to their in-
come. Speciﬁcally, deﬁne an individual’s induced indiﬀerence curve as that
combination of t and g which yields some expected income, EY. The slope
of an indiﬀerence curve, σ, i.e., the individual’s marginal rate of substitution
















(1−a(1−t))s+te if r>0a n de∗ =ˆ e
by ≤ t
s+ty if r>0a n de∗ = y
, (3)
use having been made of (1).
5An individual’s optimal tax rate – provided an interior solution exists –
must satisfy the necessary condition that the slope of the budget constraint
equals the slope of an indiﬀerence curve.
A majority voting equilibrium can be shown to exist if the single crossing
property holds, that is, if the indiﬀerence curves of two individuals cross
once and only once, or, alternatively, if σ is either always decreasing or always
increasing in income.5 Consider ﬁgure 1, which shows the government budget
constraint and the indiﬀerence curves of two voters, y1 and y2 <y 1. Suppose
individual 2 is the median voter. If the single crossing property holds as in
the ﬁgure, than exactly ﬁfty percent of voters have indiﬀerence curves which
are steeper than y2; these individuals therefore prefer a lower tax rate than
the median voter. Likewise, half of the voters have ﬂatter indiﬀerence curves
than y2 and thus prefer higher tax rates. There would in this case be no
majority for taxes which are either higher or lower than that preferred by
the median voter.
Obviously, σ is increasing in y when evasion is zero. For positive levels of
evasion, however, it cannot be shown in general that σ is either increasing or
decreasing in y, unless a = 1 which implies σ = y.6 For a<1, however, this
will not hold and therefore a majority voting equilibrium cannot be shown to
exist in general. Note, however, that single crossing is a suﬃcient condition.
Equilibria may exist even if single crossing does not hold.
In the example, it turns out that an equilibrium does exist. I will hence-
forth assume this to be the case. I will also assume σ to be increasing in
y, which implies higher income individuals prefer marginally lower taxes. It
can then be shown that the equilibrium corresponds to the optimal tax rate
and transfer of the voter with median income, ym.7
5See Gans and Smart (1996) for a discussion of this approach.
6Also, if utility exhibits constant absolute risk aversion (u = −e−rc), optimal evasion
is independent of income which implies σy =1 .
7Borck (2002) shows that an equilibrium does not necessarily exists when there is a
lump sum penalty in addition to the tax surcharge. Moreover, if σ were decreasing in
income, equilibrium existence cannot be proven since preferences satisfy single crossing in
the region where individuals do not evade and in the region where they do evade separately,








Suppose the probability of detection is exogenously increased. Obviously,
for given tax rate, this would lead to less evasion. But since the tax rate is
endogenous, we have to consider the change of the tax rate as well.
Speciﬁcally, an increase of p has two eﬀects: ﬁrst, assuming etp = egt =
egp = egg =0a n dt h a t¯ et is not too negative, the slope of the government







=[ {(1 − p)t − pbs)¯ eg}{(1 + as)¯ e +( pas − 1+p)(¯ ep +¯ eggp)
+ ((1 − a + at)s +1 ) t¯ et}−{¯ y +( pas − (1 − p))¯ e
+( pbs − (1 − p))t¯ et}{(−t − (1 − a + at)s)¯ eg}]




(t + bs)¯ e +( pbs − (1 − p)t)¯ ep
((1 − p)t − pbs)¯ eg
> 0.
If ¯ et is not too negative, both the ﬁrst and second terms within curly
brackets in (4) are positive, the third is positive and the fourth negative,
making the whole expression positive.
Intuitively, since individuals will evade less, for given tax rate and trans-
fer, each percentage increase in the tax rate raises more revenue. Second,
however, the individual indiﬀerence curve also gets steeper. This can be seen
by diﬀerentiating (3) on noting that ep < 0. Since evasion is reduced for
given t and g, each individual has a lower marginal willingness to raise taxes
for redistribution.
Since both the budget constraint and the indiﬀerence curve become steeper,
a voter’s optimal tax rate may either rise or fall. Not much more can be said
at this point. However, one can get a result for how the eﬀect of p impacts
voters with diﬀering income levels. Namely, it turns out that the increase in
the slope of the indiﬀerence curve gets larger with larger income if absolute
risk aversion is decreasing in income. To prove this, note that
σyp = −
(1 − a)s
(1 − a + at)s + t
eyp.
Diﬀerentiating (1), using the deﬁnition of ρ and (1) gives
eyp =
(1 − t)(bs + t)(bρ 
dρns + ρdρ 
nt)(bsu 








This expression is negative if ρ  < 0 for all c, i.e., if absolute risk aversion
is decreasing in income. That is, lower income voters are more likely to prefer
a higher tax rate when the probability of detection rises. Intuitively, when p
rises, the costs of redistribution fall to a larger extent on high income voters
who evade more (assuming decreasing absolute risk aversion). Lower income
voters are more likely to prefer a higher tax rate as a result.
In the following, assume that the median voter’s optimal tax rate rises
with an increase in audit probability. The total eﬀect of an increase in audit












There are then three eﬀects on evasion. First, the direct eﬀect implies
that – for given t and g – evasion will fall. Second, however, the tax rate
increases. Depending on the speciﬁc comparative statics, this may decrease
or increase evasion, other things equal. Third, the increase in the transfer
increases net income which increases evasion, other things equal, assuming
decreasing absolute risk aversion. As a result of the rising tax rate and
transfer, evasion may even increase. The example in the next section shows
that this may be the case.
A similar comparative statics exercise can be performed with respect to
the penalty rate s. Diﬀerentiating (3) yields σs > 0, and the slope of the
budget constraint increases as well. The sign of σsy is ambiguous. Therefore,
one cannot say whether the equilibrium tax rate increases or decreases with
an increase in the ﬁne. Whether an increase of the tax rate is more likely
the higher median income is also ambiguous. In the example in the next
section, however, the eﬀect of the ﬁne rate is analogous to that of the audit
probability in that the equilibrium tax rate and aggregate evasion increase.
5 A Numerical Example
For simplicity, let there be three voters, with income y1 =1 ,y 2 =2 ,y 3 =3 .5.
Let a =0 .4a n ds =0 .2. Utility is u =l o g c, which exhibits decreasing
absolute risk aversion. Optimal evasion, at an interior solution, is given by
ˆ e =
r((1−t)y+g)
bs+t . Inserting into (3) shows that the single crossing property
does not hold. However, it can be checked that the median income earner is
indeed decisive. In order to do this, insert the optimal tax rate of the median
income earner into the utility functions of voters 1 and 3 and check that no
tax rate exists which is preferred by both.8
For p =0 .1, we ﬁnd t =0 .013602,g =0 .0294489, and ¯ e =0 .527035.
Increasing p to 0.2 increases the tax rate to t =0 .021752,grises to 0.0470867,
and ¯ e to 0.560051.
8Details are available from the author.
9However, we also ﬁnd that the relation between p,t,a n d¯ e is not mono-
tonic. For p =0 .05, we ﬁnd t =1 ,g =0 .496091, and ¯ e =5 .33163. The
reason for this result is somewhat speciﬁc to the present functional forms.
In particular, it turns out that for both values of p, there is a rather large
range of tax rates where all voters evade all of their income. At some t,
however, the richest voter starts evading less than his entire income. Hence,
the budget constraint gets steeper. Since this tax rate is lower for lower p,
the median voter actually prefers the highest possible tax rate for the lower
probability of detection.
Letting p =0 .1 again and increasing the ﬁne rate to 0.25, we ﬁnd t =
0.0170908,g=0 .0369929, and ¯ e =0 .52849. Thus, the eﬀect of the ﬁne rate
is analogous to that of the audit rate.
6 The Choice of Audit Rates by Bureaucrats
Up until now, I have assumed the audit probability to be exogenous, for
instance, because it is controlled by a bureaucratic agency. However, if this
is the case, it will be useful to assume the agency to pursue its own objec-
tives.9 In particular, assume the tax authority is a Niskanen-type bureaucrat
aiming to maximize his budget.10 With respect to timing, we distinguish
two possible cases: either, the bureaucrat goes ﬁrst, or voters choose the tax
rate before the bureaucrat sets the enforcement strategy. While the ﬁrst case
conforms more closely with the basic model presented above, the second case
has the advantage that one can analyze voters’ incentives to constrain the
bureaucracy by the choice of tax rate.
9There is a growing literature on optimal audit policies, where optimality is deﬁned
either as budget maximization or maximization of social welfare (see, e.g., Andreoni, Erard,
and Feinstein, 1998 and Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2000, and the references therein). In all
of these models, however, the tax rate is exogenous. The focus is usually the use of audit
rules to make taxpayers reveal their type.
10A model where voters choose taxes and bureaucrats expenditures is presented by
Gordon and Wilson (1999) and Wilson and Gordon (2001). In their models, voters can
constrain the bureaucracy both by the choice of tax structure and by voting them out of
oﬃce if voter utility falls below a certain threshold.
106.1 Bureaucrat moves ﬁrst
Suppose the bureaucracy sets the audit probability before voters choose the
tax rate. For given p, voters’ problem is exactly like before. The bureaucrat
recognizes that her choice of tax rate inﬂuences the tax rate.
Let a = 1, and assume that the bureaucrat incurs a resource cost of c(p),
with c  > 0,c    ≥ 0. The bureaucrat simply maximizes total tax revenue
minus transfers. The diﬀerence between revenue and expenditure may be
interpreted as “waste” from the voters’ point of view. From the bureaucracy’s
view, large discretionary budgets are assumed to increase their self esteem
and thus utility.
The bureaucrat’s problem is then:
max
p R = t¯ y +( ps − (1 − p))t¯ e − g − c(p)
If t were endogenous, the ﬁrst order condition would be
F := (1 + s)t¯ e +( ps − (1 − p))t¯ ep − c
  =0 . (5)
When the tax rate is inﬂuenced by the audit rate, the ﬁrst order condition is
(1 + s)t¯ e +( ps − (1 − p))t¯ ep − c




Comparing (5) and (6) shows that if the tax rate increases with the audit
rate, endogeneity of the tax rate creates an additional incentive for a revenue
maximizing bureaucrat to raise taxes: each dollar spent on auditing then
creates additional revenue through the ensuing increase in the tax rate.
6.2 Voters move ﬁrst
Assume now that the timing is reversed: At the ﬁrst stage, individuals vote
on the tax rate. At the second stage, the bureaucrat chooses the audit
rate, and ﬁnally, at the last stage individuals choose how much to pay in
taxes, given the tax system and the enforcement parameters. The individual
problem therefore has the same structure as assumed before.
The tax authority’s problem is to maximize revenue for given t,g,a n d
the ﬁrst order condition is (5). This gives the equilibrium audit probability,
p(s,t,g, ¯ y). Diﬀerentiating (5) w.r.t. t and g, assuming etp = egp =0 ,g i v e s :
11pt = −




(1 + s)t¯ eg
Fp
(8)
where Fp =( s + t)¯ ep +( ps − (1 − p))t¯ epp − c
  .
Assume that epp ≥ 0 so the second order condition is fulﬁlled. Then pg > 0,
and pt > 0i fet > 0. If marginal tax revenue (as function of the audit prob-
ability) rises with the tax rate, then the bureaucrat will react by increasing
the tax rate.
Voters are forward looking and choose the tax rate, taking into account
the bureaucrat’s reaction. The problem is
max
t
pu((1 − t)y − ste + g)+( 1− p)u((1 − t)y + te + g),
























Comparing (9) to the optimality condition with exogenous audit proba-






. Assuming pt to be
positive, ud <u n implies the incentives for taxation are reduced. Since the
bureaucrat reacts to the higher tax rate by more intense auditing, voters’
utility is reduced. Lower tax rates safeguard against the exploitation of vot-
ers by self interested bureaucrats. However, from the voters’ viewpoint, taxes
are ineﬃciently low.11
6.3 Comparative Statics
What is the eﬀect of an increase in audit costs on taxes, audit probability,
and evasion? While the answer is straightforward in the ﬁrst model pre-
sented above (bureaucracy moves ﬁrst), it is not as simple in the second one
11See also Sanchez and Sobel (1993), who show that government provides a smaller
budget to a tax authority than the authority ﬁnds optimal.
12(voters move ﬁrst). Suppose that audit costs are linear: c(p)=cp. Then,
diﬀerentiating (5) or (6) with respect to c, the marginal beneﬁt of increasing
audits falls for the tax authority in both models.
In the ﬁrst model, it follows that (a) the tax authority reduces the audit
rate, and (b) voters react by reducing the tax rate, assuming dt
dp > 0. The
eﬀect on evasion is then analogous to the eﬀect of an exogenous reduction in
p as analyzed in Section 4 above. In particular, if stricter enforcement were
to increase tax evasion due to the tax rate eﬀect, higher marginal auditing
costs would reduce audit rate which would reduce the optimal tax rate and
therefore lead to less evasion. Conversely, lower auditing costs would lead to
more enforcement and more evasion.
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Examining (10), if −y − se +
dg
dt > 0, the ﬁrst line is positive (since
u 
d >u  
n from cd <c n), the second line is negative since
dg
dp > 0, and the sign
of the third line is ambiguous. In sum, while the tax authority would reduce
the audit rate, for given tax rate, this may lead voters to prefer a lower or
higher tax rate. It may be that the lower audit rate leads voters to prefer
a higher tax rate which in turn may increase tax evasion. Thus, the eﬀect
of an increase in marginal auditing costs depends on the exact nature of the
interaction between taxpayer-voters and the tax authority.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that stricter enforcement policies on tax evasion,
such as increasing the probability of audit, may actually increase evasion.
The reason is that for individuals who do not evade a large portion of their
13income, stricter enforcement makes taxation more attractive. Higher tax
rates and transfers, in turn, may lead to more evasion. If the indirect eﬀect
through the tax rate and transfer dominates the direct eﬀect, total evasion
rises.
Estimating structural models of tax evasion is notoriously diﬃcult, not
least because of the diﬃculty in obtaining reliable data. Even accounting
for this, however, past studies have sometimes found seemingly paradoxical
results. For instance, Witte and Woodbury (1985) did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
eﬀect of audit rates on compliance. However, they treated the audit rate
as exogenous, which produces biased and inconsistent estimates if audit rate
and compliance are both endogenous. Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1990)
recognized this problem and used two-stage least squares estimation, allowing
the audit rate to be endogenous. They ﬁnd the predicted positive eﬀect of
audits on compliance.
However, if the tax rate is endogenous as well, this result would not be
unbiased either. In the short run, one might argue that taxpayers treat the
tax rate as given. However, when using data from multiple years, one should
recognize the potential endogeneity of the tax rate. Future empirical work
should test for this endogeneity.
The model presented here may also yield other insights. In general, voting
equilibria with tax evasion or avoidance may not exist (Borck, 2002; Roine,
1999). Further, when they do exist they may have interesting properties.
In Borck (2002), examples are presented where the equilibrium tax rate is
such that income is eﬀectively redistributed from the middle class (who pay
taxes) to the poor (who also pay taxes) and the rich (who do not pay taxes).
Thus, the choice of tax rate by voting may have consequences which are not
entirely obvious.
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